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Abstract 
 
A.I. Jacobs 
Locke, Toleration, and God’s Providence 
    (Under the direction of Lloyd Kramer) 
 
This essay is an exploration of some of the theological dimensions of Locke’s 
theory of toleration. First, I argue that the skepticism that is often associated with Locke’s 
argument against religious coercion would have been unintelligible to Locke and his 
contemporaries. Second, I offer an alternative reading of Locke’s theory based upon his 
exchange with Jonas Proast. I argue that by examining the debate between Locke and 
Proast, one can see that Locke’s theory rested upon his conception of providentialism, 
specifically the distinction between God’s ordinary and extraordinary providence. In my 
view, it was Locke’s belief that God would not fail to provide the means for human 
salvation that allowed him to contend that beliefs incapable of rational assessment fall 
outside the jurisdiction of the magistrate. Finally, I conclude with some general thoughts 
on the implications of a providential reading of Locke for interpretations of the early 
enlightenment. 
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Introduction: Locke, Toleration, and the Modes of Intellectual History 
 
 In 1691, while debating the toleration of Protestant dissent, John Locke and the 
Oxford Divine Jonas Proast digressed into a heated exchange over the nature and purpose 
of miracles. What follows is a discussion of their disagreement, and of how it ought to 
influence our thinking about the sources of Locke's theory of toleration. My central 
contentions are twofold. First, I assert that without sufficient theological backing, the 
pragmatic and skeptical strategies that are often attributed to the Letter Concerning 
Toleration would have been unintelligible to Locke and his contemporaries. Second, I 
argue that when one moves beyond the first Letter and into Locke’s debate with Proast, 
those missing theological supports become apparent. Locke did think that skepticism and 
political pragmatism were necessary elements of good government, but he did not think 
that on their own they provided adequate grounds for the toleration of religious dissent. 
In my view, Locke’s argument for toleration was underwritten by his particular 
understanding of God’s Providence, an understanding he inherited from Scholastic, 
Reformed and Dissenting theology. Further, the theological roots of Locke’s theory have 
much broader implications for how we ought to regard the development of late 
seventeenth century theories of tolerance, and indeed the origins of Enlightenment 
naturalism more generally. 
  Despite Locke’s importance in the history of philosophy and the canonical status 
of the Letter Concerning Toleration in liberal political theory, very little scholarly 
attention has been paid to Locke’s debate about toleration with Jonas Proast, the only 
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extended public debate in which Locke ever allowed himself to be engaged.1 What little 
work has been done has generally analyzed Locke’s debate with Proast from one of two 
different and largely opposed perspectives. Political theorists, on the one hand, have 
mined the debate for insights as to whether or not Locke’s arguments against religious 
coercion are actually effective and therefore adequate supports for current theories of 
toleration. Proast here is ‘the persecutor’ who serves as a proxy for the commentator’s 
own scrutiny of the limits of Locke’s thinking. Notoriously, Jeremy Waldron has 
concluded that when considered on the merits of the arguments alone, Proast won the 
contest decisively.2  On the other, historians of political thought such as Mark Goldie 
have used the debate as a means to more firmly embed Locke’s thought in the political 
circumstances of the 1690s. In Goldie’s view, Locke and Proast’s arguments are 
“intramural partisan pieces” in the struggle between the high and low church parties for 
the control of the Anglican Church.3 
Both of these approaches have their advantages, but there is danger on either side 
as well. The complaints against the political theorist’s approach to the history of ideas are 
                                                
1The most notable examples are Jeremy Waldron, “Locke, Toleration, and the Rationality of 
Persecution,” in Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives, ed. Susan 
Mendus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 61-86; Mark Goldie, “John Locke, 
Jonas Proast and Religious Toleration 1688-1692,” in The Church of England c.1689-c.1683: 
From Toleration to Tractarianism, eds. John Walsh, Colin Haydon and Stephen Taylor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 143-71; Peter Nicholson, “John Locke’s Later 
Letters on Toleration” In A Letter Concerning Toleration in Focus, eds. John Horton and Susan 
Mendus (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 12-56; Richard Vernon, The Career of 
Toleration: John Locke, Jonas Proast and After (Montreal and Kingston: Mcgill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1997); Adam Wolfson, “Toleration and Relativism: The Locke-Proast 
Exchange,” The Review of Politics 59.2 (Spring, 1997): 213-31. 
 
2 Waldron, 83-84. 
 
3 Goldie, 161. 
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well known.4 Though not necessarily so, such discussions evince a marked tendency 
toward anachronism, as thinkers address ‘timeless’ political questions in a manner that 
may or may not have anything to do with their actual historical circumstances or authorial 
intentions. The worry with the alternate approach, expressed far less often (perhaps 
because its advocates constitute the reigning orthodoxy), is of falling into Namierite 
reductionism, where the intellectual substance of the ideas being expressed ineluctably 
dissolves into the narrow concerns of class and party. The resulting ‘history of discourse’ 
at times has the appearance of being about everything surrounding a given speech act, 
and not the content of the act itself.5  
My approach in this paper, one much influenced by the recent work of Ian Hunter, 
Knud Haakonsen, T.J. Hochstrasser, Richard Tuck and especially J.B. Schneewind, lies 
somewhere between these two positions.6 I focus principally on the arguments 
themselves, but with the firm understanding that their points of reference are those of the 
late seventeenth and not the early twenty-first century. We cannot assume that western 
intellectual life has been consumed from Socrates to the present day with a uni-vocal set 
of issues that all thinkers have been trying to solve, with the accretion of proposed 
solutions gradually progressing toward a correct answer. The formulation and solution of 
                                                
4 See Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and 
Theory, 8.1 (1969): 3-53 and John Dunn, “The Identity of the History Ideas,” Philosophy 43 
(1968): 85-116. 
 
5 See Francis Oakley, Omnipotence, Covenant, and Order (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1984), 15-40 and Dominic Lacapra, Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, 
Contexts, Language (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983), 23-71.  
 
6 Knud Haakonsen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy from Grotius to the Scottish 
Enlightenment, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); J.B. Schneewind, The Invention 
of Autonomy: a History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998); Ian Hunter, Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern 
Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) Richard Tuck, Philosophy and 
Government 1571-1650 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
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philosophical problems are inescapably shaped and limited by the context in which they 
occur. This does not mean, however, that we can understand philosophical argumentation 
as historical activity simply by examining the immediate circumstances surrounding it. 
We must also attend to what might be called the proximate intellectual contexts of 
philosophical argument.7 Every age has its own baseline set of assumptions about what 
the most significant philosophical problems are and its own specialized languages for 
making sense of them. It is by reconstructing these local philosophical mentalités and 
situating specific arguments within them that we are able to understand intellectual 
activity as an historical phenomenon.  
In the 1600s, Christian theology was still arguably the most important of these 
proximate intellectual contexts.8 The education of elites in the seventeenth century was 
steeped in theological training, and the philosophical interventions of the period 
invariably reflect that background. For all the derision heaped upon the ‘schoolmen’ 
during the 1600s, educated Europeans still spoke in their language, worked with their 
theoretical categories, and assumed the basic priority of their philosophical problems. It is 
                                                
 
7 Schneewind’s crucial observation here is that when we turn our attention from political thought 
to moral philosophy it becomes much less obvious that a given thinker was attempting to 
intervene on some specific element of his immediate circumstances. J.B. Schneewind, “Teaching 
the History of Moral Philosophy,” in Teaching New Histories of Philosophy, ed. J.B. Schneewind 
(Princeton: Princeton Center for Human Values, 2004), 191. My view is that this point could be 
extended considerably because moral philosophy was rarely, if ever, separated from political 
thought in the early modern period.   
 
8 Nicholas Jolley, “The Relation between Theology and Philosophy,” in The Cambridge History 
of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, eds. Daniel Garber, Michael Ayers, with the assistance of 
Roger Ariew and Alan Gabbey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 363-92 and 
Richard Popkin, “The Religious Background of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy,” in Garber and 
Ayers, The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, 393-424. This assertion of 
theology’s centrality is in contrast to the pronounced tendency of historians of political thought to 
assume classical republicanism as the most important and dynamic conceptual idiom available. 
While there is much to be said for such a position, I think it has been overdrawn.  
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thus of principal importance in evaluating the philosophical thought of the seventeenth 
century to pay close attention to pervasive religious allusion and theological terminology. 
With regard to the debate between Locke and Proast, the primary advantage this approach 
affords is that it allows one to appreciate the seemingly more esoteric dimensions of the 
dispute, dimensions that may appear ‘dead’ to the political theorist or as empty rhetorical 
window-dressing to the historian of political thought. The discussion of God’s 
Providence and its relation to questions of religious coercion, though it occupies a 
significant amount of space in Locke and Proast’s extraordinarily verbose exchange, has 
never been discussed more than in passing in the scholarly literature. My aim in this 
paper is to rectify that neglect, and suggest moreover that the providential themes of the 
Letters Concerning Toleration play a key role in explaining Locke’s overall thinking 
about toleration and its relationship to Christian morality.
The Letters Concerning Toleration and Locke’s Skeptical Prudence 
There was a time when historians of England treated the Stuart Restoration as a relatively 
benign period with regard to the toleration of religious minorities.9 Supposedly, the 
substance of toleration had been achieved in the midst of the interregnum, and although 
dissenters experienced some harsh treatment during the period 1660 to 1688, it was 
nothing compared to what had occurred earlier, or for that matter what was transpiring in 
Continental Europe. With the arrival of William and Mary, toleration was irrevocably 
secured as one of the foundations for the emerging liberal order. We know now, of 
course, that much of this is Whig fiction. As Mark Goldie says, during the Stuart 
restoration, “England was a persecuting society.”10 The Restoration had certainly begun 
on a benign note, with Charles II declaring at Breda a commitment to “liberty to tender 
consciences.”11 Shortly after the new King ascended the throne, however, things quickly 
spiraled out of control. The next twenty-eight years would be a constant see-saw of 
government attitudes and policy towards Catholics and Protestants who dissented from 
the Church of England. Indulgences were granted, then revoked. Periods of relative calm 
were followed quickly and without warning by periods of bitter and miserable 
                                                
9 An excellent historiographical discussion of the Whig interpretation of the Restoration from 
Macaulay to Jordan can be found in John Coffey, Persecution and Toleration in Protestant 
England 1558-1689 (London and New York: Longman, 2000), 1-3. 
 
10 Mark Goldie, “The Theory of Religious Intolerance in Restoration England” in From 
Persecution to Toleration: the Glorious Revolution and Religion in England, eds. Ole Peter Grell, 
Jonathan I. Israel,  and Nicholas Tyacke (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1991), 331. 
  
11 Quoted in Coffey, 166. 
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persecution. From 1660 to 1688, thousands of Catholics and Protestant dissenters were 
fined, exiled, assaulted, imprisoned and a few even executed for their refusal to join the 
Church of England.12 
John Locke had been converted to the cause of toleration during the 1660s 
through his association with Anthony Ashley Cooper, the First Earl of Shaftesbury. In 
1667, on Shaftesbury’s behalf, Locke composed An Essay on Toleration, and in 1669 the 
two men helped draft the Fundamental Constitutions of the Carolinas, which included 
provisions for the toleration of Protestant dissenters. Though both men initially had seen 
the Stuart restoration in a positive light, according to Richard Ashcraft, it was the 
frustrating experience of pleading toleration’s case in the face of endless reversals that 
gradually moved Locke and his patron toward the radical parliamentary opposition.13 In 
1683, in the aftermath of the Exclusion Crisis and the alleged Rye house plot, in which 
Locke and Shaftesbury were implicated, the two men fled England for Holland as 
fugitives. Shaftesbury would die there, and Locke would not return to England until after 
the Glorious Revolution in 1688. 
 It was during his exile in Holland that Locke composed A Letter Concerning 
Toleration. Scholars generally attribute the motivation for the Letter to three factors. 
First, in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, Locke was surrounded by other exiles and Dutch 
thinkers who promoted a plurality of deeply felt, but unorthodox theologies. For a time he 
lived at the home and salon of a Quaker, Benjamin Furly. His best friend in the 
                                                
12 Coffey, 169-178 and 182-187, and Mark Goldie, “The Hilton Gang and the Purge of London in 
1680s,” in Politics and the Political Imagination in Later Stuart Britain: Essays Presented to Lois 
Schwoerer, ed. Howard Nenner (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 1997), 43-74.  
 
13 Richard Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986): xii. 
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Netherlands, Philip Van Limborch, was a Remonstrant Divine. Locke began an affair 
with Damaris Cudworth, the daughter of the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth and an 
impressive latitudinarian theologian in her own right.14 This is of course inconclusive, but 
it seems relatively safe to suggest that Locke was in a position to appreciate the value of 
religious pluralism. If nothing else, we know he was increasingly inspired to intervene in 
the continental debates on Protestant doctrinal theology.15 Second, even after 
Shaftesbury’s death, Locke continued to be involved in subversive politics. There is some 
evidence that he even helped to finance the botched Monmouth rebellion.16 Finally, 
Locke watched with trepidation the worsening situation of the French Huguenots.  All 
these matters came to a head in 1685 with the ascendance of the openly Catholic James 
II, the failure of James Scott’s coup attempt and Louis XIV’s revocation of the Edict of 
Nantes.17 Sometime towards the end of that year, Locke composed the Letter Concerning 
                                                
14 For Locke’s relationships with Furly, Limborch and Cudworth, see John Marshall’s John 
Locke: Resistance, Religion, and Responsibility (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 329-46. 
 
15 Marshall, Resistance, Religion, and Responsibility, 330. 
 
16 Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, 375. James’ envoys in Holland at least thought Locke was up 
to something during this period, as the crown during 1684 began making concerted requests to the 
Dutch for Locke’s extradition. David Wooton, introduction to Political Writings by John Locke 
(London & New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 90. 
 
17 David Wooton suggests that James’ ascension, when placed alongside the thinly veiled anti-
catholic polemic of the letter suggests that by 1685, Locke had given up all hope of reconciliation 
with the English government or of ever returning home. Wooton, 95. Mark Goldie has produced 
evidence corroborating this view, though he suggests that during this period Locke was 
increasingly isolated from his comrades in England. Mark Goldie, “John Locke's Circle and 
James II, ”  The Historical Journal 35.3 (September 1992): 557-586. 
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Toleration, originally in Latin, and gave it to Limborch.18 It would remain unpublished 
for four more years. 
In the Letter, Locke forwards a variety of arguments against religious coercion. 
Holding them together, however, is a skeptical thread that G.A.J. Rogers has dubbed 
Locke’s ‘argument from ignorance.’19  According to Locke, the magistrate is a man like 
other men, fully capable of error. “Neither the right nor the art of ruling necessarily carry 
along with it the certain knowledge of other things.”20 This being the case, the Magistrate 
has fundamentally no better ability to determine which Church is the True one than does 
his subject. Therefore, he cannot in good conscience force what he believes to be 
Orthodoxy on his subjects, since he cannot remunerate them for his mistake if he 
accidentally earns them damnation. Consequently, the achievement of salvation for 
Locke is a purely individual matter that falls entirely outside the jurisdiction of the state. 
                                                
18 Maurice Cranston, “John Locke and The Case for Toleration,” in A Letter Concerning 
Toleration in Focus, ed. John Horton and Susan Mendus, 87-89. 
 
19 G.A.J. Rogers, “Locke and The Latitude Men: Ignorance as a Ground of Toleration,” in 
Philosophy, Science and Religion in England 1610-1700, ed. Richard Kroll, Richard Ashcraft and 
Perez Zagorin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): 230. Rogers’ account of Locke’s 
skepticism is consonant with the analyses of several other Locke scholars. See Luisa Simonutti, 
“Scepticism and the Theory of Toleration: Human Fallibility and Adiaphora” The Return of 
Scepticism: From Hobbes and Descartes to Bayle: Proceedings of the Vercelli Conference, May 
18th-20th, 2000 ed. Gianni Paganini (Dordrecht, Boston & London: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2003); Perez Zagorin, How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 240-88; Nathan Tarcov, “John Locke and the 
Foundations of Toleration,” in Early Modern Skepticism and The Origins of Toleration ed. Alan 
Levine (Lanham: Lexington Books, 1999), 179-97. See also the references from n1. For a classic 
attempt to connect skepticism and toleration on a wider scale see Quentin Skinner, The 
Foundations of Modern Political Thought vol 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 
247-49; 
 
20 John Locke, “The Letter Concerning Toleration,” in The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes, 
Vol. 5. (London: Rivington, 1824), 25. In this essay I rely exclusively on the William Popple 
translation of the first Letter, though I have consulted the Kiblansky and Gough version as well. 
John Locke, Epistola de tolerantia;  A Letter Concerning Toleration,  Latin text ed. Raymond 
Klibansky; trans. J. W. Gough. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1968) I agree with Richard Ashcraft 
that no modern translation can come closer to capturing Locke’s intended meaning when Locke 
himself defended the Popple version. Ashcraft, 498 n127.  
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Locke thus asserts that different visions of how to achieve salvation are equally 
epistemically problematic. Their respective truth-probabilities are unknown and cannot 
conclusively be established. The magistrate and his subjects may differ deeply on the 
finer points of worship, but since they lack an independent criterion for determining who 
is correct, only God holds the knowledge to judge between them. “The purity of their 
worship, and the truth of their doctrines, is on both sides equal…The decision of that 
question belongs to the supreme judge of men to whom also alone belongs the 
punishment of the erroneous.”21 Both the magistrate and his subjects should exercise 
restraint due to the limitations on their ability to know the absolute truth of religious 
matters. 
The obvious question about this formulation has to do with limits. Where should 
one draw the boundaries as to what the magistrate ought and ought not to tolerate? Locke 
foresees this problem and explicates it in the form of a possible objection to his argument 
from ignorance. If it is not in the magistrate’s power to forbid a religious sect from 
engaging in any specific practice in the course of the worship of God, then what can be 
done when a sect wishes to engage in something that is deeply and indisputably 
objectionable? That is, if the magistrate is so constrained, then what could he possibly do 
with respect to sectarians who would wish to sacrifice children as part of their religious 
ceremonies, or alternatively “lustfully pollute themselves in promiscuous 
                                                
 
21 Locke, “Letter Concerning Toleration,” 19. 
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uncleanliness?”22 What makes the magistrate’s knowledge of the ultimate morality of 
these practices any greater than his knowledge of seemingly morally indifferent things?   
Locke’s response to this problem is that the magistrate’s jurisdiction is limited to 
the “worldly welfare of the commonwealth.”23 Human sacrifice and licentiousness clearly 
fall within the magistrate’s jurisdiction, Locke argues, because “these things are not 
lawful in the ordinary course of life.”24 He then goes on to say that “whatsoever is 
permitted unto any of [the Magistrate’s] subjects for their ordinary use, neither ought to 
be forbidden by him to any sect of the people for their religious uses.”25 In Locke’s view, 
we ought to determine what can and cannot be tolerated by considering  it removed from 
its religious context. If we permit Latin in the marketplace, then we ought to permit Latin 
liturgy. If we prohibit murder at a fair, then we ought also to proscribe in it a Church 
service.26  
Thus, it appears that Locke’s argument from ignorance is what Richard Popkin 
has labeled ‘mitigated’ or ‘constructive’ skepticism, an attempt to use skeptical 
arguments to demolish certain kinds of knowledge while insulating others, resulting in a 
                                                
22 Ibid., 33. Locke was familiar with this line of argument against skeptical cases for tolerance. It 
was in fact precisely the argument he had used against Edward Bagshaw in his anti-tolerationist 
Two Tracts on Government, written twenty years earlier while Locke was still the Censor of 
Moral Philosophy at Oxford’s Christ Church College. See Jacqueline Rose, “John Locke, 
‘Matters Indifferent,’ and The Restoration Church of England” The Historical Journal 48.3 
(2005): 601-621.  
 
23 Locke, “Letter Concerning Toleration,” 54. 
 
24 Ibid., 33. 
 
25 Ibid., 37.  
 
26 Ibid., 51. 
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chastened but effective epistemology.27 In Locke’s view, the magistrate is limited to 
considering evidence from the ‘ordinary course of life’ when attempting to determine 
what religious practices may be tolerated. The legal status of religious rituals should stem 
from a purely prudential assessment of the danger they pose to the public order.28 
This is good so far as it goes. There are few claims to knowledge that can survive 
a thoroughly skeptical scrutiny, and political moderation does superficially seem to 
follow from humility about one’s knowledge of religious matters.29 Nonetheless, I would 
like to suggest that this skeptical-prudential argument would have been unintelligible to 
Locke as formulated here. First, there is a deep theoretical difficulty with interpreting 
Locke skeptically. Simply put, skepticism is hard to control because its ability to dissolve 
the evidentiary foundations of an argument applies just as well to one’s own positions as 
it does to those of one’s opponent. Indeed, the logical conclusion of arguments in which 
skepticism is invoked is a situation in which no arguments are justified, in which 
arguments are nothing more than contests between baseless opinions.  
                                                
27 Popkin, The History of Skepticism, 112-28, as well as his preface to Hendrik G. van Leeuwen, 
The Problem of Certainty in English Thought, 1630-1690 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963). 
As Popkin points out, this argumentative strategy became quite popular in the middle of the 
seventeenth century, and not only in England. In Popkin’s view, the philosophies of Pierre 
Gassendi and Marin Mersenne (with whom Locke was also familiar) can also be characterized as 
forms of mitigated or constructive skepticism. Popkin, History of Skepticism, 112.  
 
28 It should be noted that it was precisely this formulation that allowed Locke to deny toleration to 
Catholics and atheists. Catholics cannot be tolerated because they will always possess a loyalty to 
a foreign prince. Atheists will always pose a threat to civil society because without a concept of 
God, they have no concept of promises, and thus no concept of law. Locke, “Letter Concerning 
Toleration,” 46-48.  
 
29 It is this supposed ‘metaphysical neutrality’ that forms the backbone of the classic accounts of 
political liberalism. See Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (London: Oxford University Press, 
1969) and John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
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More to the point, for Locke’s contemporaries, there was nothing that suggested 
that toleration followed necessarily from an admission of the frailty of human knowledge 
about the precise will of God. As Richard Tuck has skillfully pointed out, skepticism in 
the seventeenth century was a politically neutral philosophy. It aimed principally at 
disciplining the self into a state of ataraxia through suspension of belief about matters of 
contention, so that one might be able to live happily and healthfully in periods of tumult 
and controversy.30 As a consequence, it was an argumentative device as likely to be used 
by establishment thinkers against the heterodox as the other way around. Grotius, 
Lipsius, and Hobbes, for instance, all began from skeptical premises and ended up 
arguing that the magistrate had every right to enforce religious uniformity for the sake of 
the public good. 
Similar problems arise when we consider Locke’s political pragmatism. Peter 
Miller and J.A.W. Gunn have both documented this type of ‘public interest’ argument for 
religious toleration amongst seventeenth-century economic and political writers.31 
Further, Gary De Krey, John Scott, and John Marshall have suggested that in the early 
years of the restoration several prominent Dissenters, such as Slingsby Bethel and John 
                                                
30 Richard Tuck, “Skepticism and Toleration in the Seventeenth Century,” in Justifying 
Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives, ed. Susan Mendus (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University press, 1988), 21-36. 
 
31 J.A.W. Gunn, Politics and the Public Interest in the Seventeenth Century (London:Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd., 1969); Ibid., “Interest Will Not Lie: A Seventeenth Century Political Maxim,” 
Journal of the History of Ideas 29.4 (Oct-Dec, 1968): 551-64 and Peter N. Miller, Defining the 
Common Good: Empire, Religion and Philosophy in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1-20 and 266-333. 
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Humfrey forwarded similar arguments.32 Nonetheless, the idea that Locke easily balanced 
his skepticism with a prudential calculus remains problematic. While prudential cases for 
toleration were made, they were continually hamstrung in their reception by their 
association with an amoral ‘reason of state’ and Hobbesianism.33 It may initially seem 
odd to hang an argument for religious toleration on the same family tree as, say, having 
one’s political opponents strangled in the middle of dinner or giving the sovereign the 
power to determine the answer to 2+2.  In order to understand arguments for toleration in 
this manner, it is necessary that we follow the advice of Alex Tuckness and Maurice 
Cranston and temporarily depart from our modern outlook that touts pluralism as a virtue 
for a community and toleration as a basic principle of politics.34 Instead, we must come to 
terms with an older but in some ways more consistent view, namely that the existence of 
pluralism is deeply objectionable, and toleration therefore an unacceptable 
                                                
32 Gary S. De Krey, “Rethinking the Restoration: Dissenting Cases for Conscience, 1667-1672,” 
The Historical Journal, 38.1 (Mar., 1995): 53-83 and John Marshall, John Locke, Toleration 
and Early Enlightenment Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 536-67. 
  
33 Indeed, as Jose Fernandez-Santa Maria has pointed out in a different context, one of the most 
referenced examples of political duplicity in anti-reason of state polemic was Henry IV. What 
better example could there be of the amoral political actor who became an apostate to win the 
crown and then used his power to extend toleration to his former co-religionists? Jose Fernandez-
Santa Maria, “Reason of State and Statecraft in Spain, 1595-1640” Journal of The History of 
Ideas 41.3 (Jul-Sept, 1980): 361. While Locke obviously did not share the association of 
toleration with immorality, there is ample evidence to suggest that he also did not view positively 
the notion of a magistrate governing only by the public interest. He mocks the notion that 
governments can both be legitimate and contrary to God’s authority in his notes on William 
Sherlock in 1690. John Locke, “On William Sherlock,” in Political Essays, ed. Mark Goldie 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 315-17.  
 
34 Maurice Cranston, “John Locke and The Case for Toleration,” in A Letter Concerning 
Toleration in Focus, ed. John Horton and Susan Mendus, 78 and Alex Tuckness “Rethinking the 
Intolerant Locke” American Journal of Political Science 46.2 (April 2002): 288. 
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accommodation to moral error.35 Religious and secular concerns were not easily 
separated in the seventeenth century. As Robert L’Estrange put it, “Uniformity is the 
Ciment of both Christian, and Civil Societies. Take away that, and the parts drop from the 
body; one piece falls from another.”36 This was the consensus viewpoint, and to argue 
that it could be pragmatically put to one side was to open oneself to charges of irreligion.  
There were local dimensions to this problem as well. Over the course of the 
restoration, arguments for the indulgence of dissenters based on considerations of the 
public interest had become inextricably linked with the King’s dispensing power. To 
assert that a magistrate had the power to overrule the existing laws against dissenters on a 
case by case basis thus carried an implied endorsement of expanded executive powers, 
perhaps even absolutism. This, for obvious reasons, was something Locke would have 
been largely unprepared to do.37  
For all these reasons, it seems problematic to suggest that Locke’s skeptical 
prudence can be taken at face value. In the late seventeenth century, few people believed 
that skepticism favored toleration over uniformity, and political pragmatism was widely 
regarded as a veil for radical metaphysics. Despite this, the fact remains that by 1685 
Locke saw limited skepticism, political prudence and freedom of religious worship as 
                                                
35 It should be noted that this certainly did not mean that both functional and principled 
arrangements and theories of toleration did not occur prior to early-modern arguments for them. 
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36 Quoted in Coffey, 38. 
 
37 Vernon, The Career of Toleration, 10-12.  
 16 
logically connected concepts. The real question then is how precisely he saw them as 
being related to one another. The beginnings of an answer, however, lie outside the scope 
of arguments covered in the first Letter. Rather, it is in the cut and thrust of his extended 
debate with Proast that we can begin to see the real character of Locke’s skeptical 
prudence, and why he was so confident that it entailed exactly the kind of religious 
tolerance he advocated.
Jonas Proast and God’s Extraordinary Providence 
By 1689 Locke’s circumstances had changed radically. He had returned from 
Holland shortly after the revolution and had immediately taken up various kinds of 
service in William III’s new government. Initially offered the ambassadorship in 
Brandenburg, he declined in favor of becoming the Commissioner of Appeals. 
Unfortunately, the London air did not agree with Locke (He was an asthmatic), and soon 
he began spending much of his time at Damaris Cudworth’s (now Lady Masham) estate 
at Oates. Locke also began publishing, though largely anonymously. 1689 saw the 
publication of the Letter in French, English, and Dutch alongside the Two Treatises on 
Government and the Essay concerning Human Understanding.38  
In the meantime, the situation for English dissenters had changed for the better as 
well. In September of 1689, after a long and bitter struggle with the High Churchmen, 
Parliament passed the Toleration Act. The new legislation allowed Presbyterians, 
Independents, and Quakers not only to abstain from communion in the Anglican Church, 
but also to license meetinghouses and worship publicly. The result was that by 1715, 
England was home to nearly two thousand dissenting congregations.39  
There were, of course, very real limits to the Act. While many scholars have been 
tempted to focus on the continued exclusion of Catholics and the categorical denial of
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toleration to anti-trinitarians, it is important to keep in mind that neither of these was 
really on the table in 1689. At a more realistic level, however, there was still much room 
for improvement. Originally, the Act’s proponents had aimed at comprehension within 
the Established Church, but implacable resistance from Tories had resulted in a move 
toward indulgence. As a consequence, The Act was marked by failure and compromise. 
The laws against religious dissent would not be repealed. Instead, their penalties would 
merely be suspended for those nonconformists who swore allegiance to the new regime. 
Additionally, the Corporation and Test Acts would remain in effect until 1828. 
Nonetheless, it can still be reasonably argued that the Glorious Revolution had, on the 
whole, proved a positive for Protestant nonconformists. For twenty years they had 
endured the proscription of their public worship. That was over, and it would not be 
back.40 
For Jonas Proast, the Toleration Act was the culminating event in a series of 
humiliations stretching back a decade. The Chaplain at All Souls College during the 
1680s, Proast had taken part in the Tory resistance to James in 1687-88, being among 
those Churchmen who refused to read the King’s declaration of indulgence from the 
pulpit. It was a decision that cost him his Chaplaincy. As James attempted to stack the 
Oxford hierarchy with Catholic sympathizers, Proast found himself under the authority of 
the new warden Leopold Finch, who promptly dismissed him. Though not initially
                                                
40 Hugh Trevor-Roper, “Toleration and Religion after 1688” in Grell, Israel and Tyacke, From 
Persecution to Toleration, 394-401.  
 
a supporter of the revolution in 1688, Proast took the oath of allegiance and expected to 
be reinstituted to his former position as reward for his resistance to James’ cronies. He 
was not. Instead the non-juroring schism of Henry Dodwell and William’s installation of 
Latitudinarian bishops left Proast and his Tory fellows profoundly alienated. His attacks 
on Locke, written in 1690, 1691, and 1704 were thus attacks on the new Low Church 
order in general, and the Toleration act of 1689 in particular as much they were 
philosophical assaults on Locke’s doctrines per se.41 
The key point of contention between Locke and Proast was Locke’s notion that 
the jurisdiction of the state be limited to matters of morality and civil interest. Proast 
continually sought to demonstrate that the state, in addition to its concern for worldly 
matters, also had care of men’s souls. It was in defense of the minimalistic vision of 
political obligation contained in the Letter that the providential bases of Locke’s theory 
emerge. Proast published his first attack on Locke under the pseudonym Philochristus 
(friend of Christ) in April 1690. The Argument of the Letter Concerning Toleration, 
Briefly Consider'd and Answer'd was a standard case for Augustinian correctio, which as 
Mark Goldie has demonstrated, formed the mainstream of the High Anglican case for 
intolerance from the 1680s onward.42 Locke had argued in the First Letter that coercion 
can only change behavior, that it cannot alter the involuntary contents of belief.43 Since 
only correct belief was sufficient to achieve salvation, coercion was thus not only unjust 
but also inefficacious. Proast countered by asserting that the penalties proposed for 
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religious dissenters would not be aimed at directly changing minds, but at creating 
inconveniences, laying out “Thorns and Briars” for those who chose to dissent from the 
True Church.44 In Proast’s view, when the inconveniences associated with dissent 
accumulated, nonconformists would increasingly feel compelled to reconsider their 
beliefs. In this way, compulsion could “indirectly and at a distance” lead the heterodox 
out of error.45 
Locke answered Proast later that same year in A Second Letter Concerning 
Toleration, also published anonymously. Here Locke treats Proast’s Augustinian case 
with derision. Proast, Locke claims, has simply not answered the arguments put forward 
in the Letter. The question is not how to lead the heterodox out of error, but rather who 
will determine which opinions are in fact erroneous. Furthermore, Locke argues, the fact 
that persecution may appear useful to us tells us nothing of God’s opinion on the matter. 
God does not do many things that would seem to us useful in propagating the true 
religion. Indeed, it might seem to the human mind that miracles would be useful in 
bringing the wayward to the true faith, as they certainly were in the apostolic period. 
Despite this, God chooses not to perform them, unless we believe in the purported 
miracles of Rome.46 Proast has not supplied an adequate criterion for determining the 
limits of the magistrate’s jurisdiction and thus has done nothing to change the parameters 
of the debate.  
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 Locke’s remark about miracles does not, on the face of it, appear central to the 
case of the Second Letter. Nonetheless, Proast seized upon it, and much of the subsequent 
debate revolved around miracles and their meaning. In his response to the Second Letter 
Proast contended that Locke, in arguing that the jurisdiction of the state extended only to 
civil interests, had misinterpreted how the Magistrate fit in with God’s providential plan 
for the world.47 In the first ages of Christianity, God had used miracles to plant and 
expand the true religion, to prevent it from being extirpated at the hands of pagans. At the 
conversion of Constantine, however, God had withdrawn his ‘extraordinary’ providence 
and thereby transferred the care of Christianity to the civil government. Toleration meant 
removing all the advantages of the true religion in the world, assuring its speedy 
destruction, “for to the corrupt Nature of Man, false Religions are ever more agreeable 
than the true.”48 
 Locke dedicated over one hundred pages of his mammoth Third Letter to taking up 
the issue of miracles and God’s providential plan for Christianity. And interestingly, the 
argument he makes is the same skeptical prudential argument, though this time set in a 
theological context. Against Proast, Locke argues that there is no reason to assume that 
withdrawal of God’s extraordinary providence at the end of the apostolic age entailed a 
transfer of the care of the true religion to the Magistrate. Historically, that is simply false. 
Further, it would suggest that in every country where the magistrate is not of the true 
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religion, miracles should be occurring continually.49 What the withdrawal of God’s 
extraordinary providence does mean is that he has made salvation a matter of individual 
concern, and he has “appointed preaching, teaching, persuasion, instruction, as a means to 
continue and propagate his true religion in the world.”50 The province of the Magistrate is 
limited to civil matters because God has not provided him the means to determine 
infallibly the correct way to salvation.  
Now, I think, the issue becomes somewhat clearer. Rather than a dispute between 
the skeptic and the anti-skeptic, the pragmatic and the ideologue, what we have in the 
Locke-Proast debate are two competing visions of the function and character of God’s 
Providence in the world. What is necessary now is to locate those opposing discourses in 
the larger context of late seventeenth century English intellectual life. Then we will be in 
a better position to assess the full consequences of a Providential reading of Locke’s 
theory of toleration.
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God’s Two Powers and the Two Forms of Providence 
 
There is no small amount of debate amongst scholars of early modern England as 
to the status of Providential discourse on the eve of the Enlightenment. In 1977, J.P. 
Kenyon argued that by the 1690s providence was by and large an empty rhetorical trope. 
Providence could be used to justify any position and it was usually deployed only in the 
company of a host of other, more culturally resonant arguments.51 Mark Goldie too has 
insisted that providence was at best a problematic concept in late Stuart political 
discourse. Focusing on the propaganda of the allegiance controversy in 1691, Goldie 
pointed out that only one commentator, William Sherlock, attempted to cast 1688 in 
providential terms, and his argument was treated largely as an object of ridicule.52 
Finally, Roy Porter has suggested that the beginning of modern probability theory in the 
late seventeenth century put Providence decisively out of business.53  
More recently, however, a group of revisionist scholars have attempted to recover 
the religious idioms of late seventeenth century political life. J.C.D. Clark, in his 
characteristically contrarian fashion, has argued that it is simply false to say that
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Providence went into decline during the seventeenth or even the eighteenth century.54 
Rather, according to Clark, political commentators continued to use it and English 
audiences continued to take it seriously. Concurring with Clark, Tony Claydon has 
insisted that providence played the predominant theme in Williamite propaganda after the 
revolution.55 Finally, Jane Shaw has suggested that the whole question of Providence’s 
status changes radically when it is taken out of its elite context and directed instead at the 
everyday lives of ordinary English men and women. Here, she argues quite compellingly, 
a flourishing ‘culture of wonders’ extended well into the eighteenth century.56 
Though my own sympathies lie with the revisionist camp, I think it could 
nevertheless be argued that all these positions share a general tendency toward 
imprecision. Providence was never a monolithic concept in Christian thought, and thus it 
is difficult to speak of its fortunes in absolute terms. In its most general sense, Providence 
denotes God’s government over the natural world, the course of history, and the 
individual lives of human beings. From there, however, it has historically been put to a 
wide variety of ideological and explanatory purposes. The variant at issue between Locke 
and Proast was God’s ‘extraordinary’ providence, his ability to work miracles above the 
established order of creation. This was in contrast to God’s ‘ordinary’ providence, 
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whereby he governs the world through what Hume would later refer to as the ‘constant 
conjunction’ of secondary cause and effect.57  
As a formal philosophical concept, the ordinary/extraordinary dyad originated as 
a sub-division of the distinction between God’s ordained and absolute powers.58 This 
latter distinction emerged gradually during the high and later Middle Ages as University 
theologians attempted to grapple with the logical difficulties stemming from God’s 
omnipotence. According to Lawrence Moonan, by 1200 the basic contours of this set of 
problems were already widely appreciated thanks to the dialectical writings of the early 
Masters such as Anselm, Abelard, and Peter Lombard.59 If God possesses unlimited 
power, then why does the world contain so much wickedness and suffering? Does 
speaking of God’s unlimited and arbitrary power when juxtaposed with such a world cast 
him as a capricious tyrant? On the other hand, If God does not have the ability to 
arbitrarily alter the world’s natural, moral, and salvific order, does that not limit his 
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power and thereby make him something less than God? Additionally, can we reconcile 
these difficulties without somehow placing morality above God or nature outside his 
power, thereby rendering him superfluous?  
The distinction between God’s absolute and ordained powers developed during 
the first half of the thirteenth century as a covenantal, compromise solution for this 
vexing set of questions.60  God’s absolute power designated his capacity to do anything 
that did not involve a logical contradiction (create a married bachelor or a round square, 
for instance). His ordained power, conversely, described those things that he had actually 
chosen to do. God might have been a tyrant, but in his infinite goodness, he had bound 
himself to an intelligible and consistent order. The two forms of God’s providence were 
sub-categories within this willed order, the two means by which He governed within the 
set boundaries he had established for himself. Interestingly enough, it appears that this 
meant that many late medieval theologians broke with the colloquial notion of a miracle 
as a contravention of nature. Since both His ordinary and his extraordinary providence 
were part of his ordained power, miracles appeared to the human mind to overturn the 
established order of creation but did not actually do so.61  
This finely wrought piece of Scholastic thinking, however, did not remain in its 
original form for long. Subsequent generations of theologians in the thirteenth, 
fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries increasingly corrupted the distinction between God’s 
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two powers, moving it away from its covenantal moorings.62 Instead, these thinkers 
would speak of God’s ability to intervene in the world as being ‘presently active.’ The 
result was the adoption of a view of reality as radically contingent, in which God 
sustained the state of things from moment to moment through his ordained powers, but 
could opt to overturn them at any time through the use of his absolute.63 Moreover, this 
new interpretation practically rendered the distinction between the potentia absoluta and 
the providentia extraordinaria moot. God’s extraordinary providence was an instance of 
where he exercised his absolute power, and the two terms were sometimes used 
interchangeably. At the same time, this ‘operationalized’ variant moved quickly into the 
realm of political theory and rhetoric. Canon Lawyers and secular political thinkers 
pressed it into service as a means to justify by analogy the wide reserve of emergency 
powers possessed by popes and kings.64  
The crucial transformation, however, occurred during the Protestant Reformation. 
Catholic theologians repeatedly challenged reformers to produce miracles to prove the 
truth of their understanding of Christian doctrine. The classic response, typified in 
Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion, was twofold. First, reformers argued that 
they were not introducing new doctrine, but rather that they had simply hit upon the 
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proper interpretation of existing revelation. They were not advocating reform in the 
modern sense, but rather in the sense of returning to the traditions of the early Church, 
making new miracles gratuitous. Second, Calvin in particular argued that miracles had 
been the province only of Christ and the original apostles. The purpose of miracles had 
been only to establish the initial truth of Christianity, not sustain it through time.65 The 
need for miracles had passed, and apparent contemporary departures from the ordinary 
course of nature should be regarded as “delusions of Satan.”66  
The Protestant doctrine of the cessation of miracles, which was widely adopted by 
reformed Churches, thus had two important consequences for conceptions of God’s 
ordinary and extraordinary providence. First, as Lorraine Daston has pointed out, it 
increased the prominence of another category of events that floated between the mundane 
and the miraculous, the preternatural. Preternatural events were those that were too rare 
to be easily considered part of God’s ordinary providence, but whose divine origin was 
nevertheless unclear. These included comets, deformed children, strange wildlife, images 
in the sky, very unusual weather, and a variety of other portents and prodigies. God could 
generate a preternatural event, but so could Satan, or various kinds of angels and demons, 
or even the standard unaided machinations of nature.67 As a consequence, wondrous 
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events could not be taken at face value. Rather, they required a careful and expert 
evaluation to determine their exact origin.  
Second, the cessation of miracles paradoxically rationalized the miraculous. As 
Peter Harrison has pointed out, by denying that the age of miracles extended beyond the 
initial years of the Christian religion, reformers inadvertently increased the centrality of 
miracles to the foundations of Christianity.68 Calvin had argued that Christianity was 
established on the basis of the miraculous abilities of Christ. That is, the reason that it 
was worth our while to believe in the divinity of Christ’s person and mission was that his 
life had been constantly attended by acts of extraordinary providence. Miracles became 
the ‘proofs’ upon which the faithful were to base their rational religious belief.69  
The concept of miracles as proofs thus added a new ‘communicative’ dimension 
to the notion of extraordinary providence. Previously, the classic Biblical illustration of 
God’s direct action in the world had been the story of Nebuchadnezzar’s fiery furnace.70 
From the Book of Daniel, the story relates an incident in which the King of Babylon 
orders three Jewish youths to bow down before a graven image. When they refuse, he 
orders that they be tossed inside a blazing furnace and burned alive. God intervenes, 
however, and prevents the flames from doing the boys any harm.71 One can see 
immediately the difference between the reformed notion of a miracle and the intervention 
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that foiled Nebuchadnezzar. In the latter case, extraordinary providence constitutes an 
actual guiding of events in a manner that reflects God’s will, while in the former miracles 
are principally a “medium of communication” whereby God instructs the faithful on what 
they ought to believe.72
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The Ordinary/Extraordinary Distinction and Locke’s Intellectual Milieu 
The ordinary/extraordinary distinction in its Protestant iteration thus became an important feature 
of the seventeenth century conceptual apparatus. With the rise of new methods of inductive 
science, the distinction was increasingly pressed into service by natural philosophers seeking to 
lay siege to the deductive systems of the scholastics and explain the natural world in a manner 
consonant with Christian doctrine. Consequently, both reductive and apologetic applications of 
the distinction can be found in the writings of many of the members of the Royal Society 
including Walter Charleton, Joseph Glanvill, John Wilkins, William Whiston, Thomas Burnett, 
and perhaps most significantly, Locke’s personal friend and colleague Robert Boyle.73  
Boyle dwelt at length on the categories of God’s providence on numerous occasions.74  
He employed the distinction repeatedly, for instance, in his attack on Aristotelian conceptions of 
nature, A FREE ENQUIRY Into the Vulgarly Receiv'd NOTION OF NATURE. For Boyle, God’s 
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ordinary Providence comprised the best framework for understanding nature’s invariant, law-like 
behavior.  
 
“'Tis intelligible to me, that God should at the Beginning impress determinate Motions 
upon the Parts of Matter, and guide them, as he thought requisite, for the Primordial 
Constitution of Things: and that ever since he should, by his ordinary and general 
Concourse, maintain those Powers, which he gave the Parts of Matter, to transmit their 
Motion thus and thus to one another.”75  
 
Nature is in no way independent of God, a notion Boyle identified with polytheism.76 Rather, 
what we colloquially refer to as nature is in fact a Dante-esque ‘art of God,’ a carefully wrought 
artifice sustained moment to moment by his divine activity.77 
Further, for Boyle, the careful study of God’s ordinary providence would help us to 
determine in specific cases if, when, and how God had actually wrought a miracle.  
 
“I think it becomes a Christian Philosopher, to admit, in general, that God doth 
sometimes in a peculiar, though hidden way, interpose in the ordinary Phaenomena and 
events of Crises's; but yet, that this is done so seldom, at least in a way that we can 
certainly discern, that we are not hastily to have recourse to an extraordinary 
Providence…if it may be probably accounted for by Mechanical Laws, and the ordinary 
Course of Things.”78  
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In other words, if we properly acquaint ourselves with the processes of secondary causation 
appointed by God, then we are less likely to find ourselves bamboozled by false portents.  
If Boyle may be taken to be representative, what can be seen here is a growing 
unwillingness amongst natural philosophers to countenance miraculous explanations for events 
that can be described and explained through the concatenation of natural causes. Such 
explanations are unnecessary, because by employing the ordinary/extraordinary distinction, we 
can come to understand that the ordinary workings of the world are themselves the product of 
God’s active presence. God’s purposes are not entirely shrouded in mystery. Rather, by close and 
careful attention to how things appear to us in the mundane events of everyday life, we can learn 
some significant portion of God’s plan for the world. God has endowed the world with sets of 
natural properties, and he has outfitted his creatures with the faculties to navigate and understand 
those properties. In other words, whatever God intends for human beings to know about a given 
matter of fact, can be discovered by reason. 
If its reductive and apologetic uses in natural philosophy provided one context in which 
Locke may have become familiar with the ordinary/extraordinary distinction, another was the 
1670s controversy surrounding Samuel Parker’s ferocious attack on religious dissent, A 
Discourse of Ecclesiastical Politie.79 Parker was a staunch Erastian (so much so that he was 
accused by more than one commentator of being a Hobbist), and his Discourse was aimed at 
demonstrating that the Magistrate ought to have direct control over all the outward features of 
religious practice.80 In an argument virtually indistinguishable from the one Proast would 
advance against Locke twenty years later, Parker argued that in the first ages of Christianity, 
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“when [the Church] wanted the assistance of the Civil Magistrate,” the Apostles had used the 
miraculous powers bestowed upon them by Christ to defeat the enemies of the true religion. 
“And thus was the Primitive Discipline maintain'd by Miracles of severity, as long as it wanted 
the Sword of the Civil Power.”81  
Miracles, according to Parker, had ceased upon the conversion of Constantine. From then 
on, salvation lay in the hands of the established Church, as governed by the Magistrate.82 That 
the Church of England was the heir to this tradition, in Parker’s view, was evident to all “sober 
and rational” individuals.83  By separating from the established Church, dissenters unbound 
themselves from God’s moral law and the order of salvation. They were no better than the 
Donatists whom Constantine had crushed. They were a “wild and fanatique rabble,” 
“enthusiasts” whose mere existence threatened both the civil and spiritual order of society.84 
 The Discourse provoked a wave of responses over the course of the 1670s, not least 
because in addition to his theoretical arguments, Parker also appeared to advocate civil and 
popular violence against dissenters. The most prominent responses came from Robert Ferguson, 
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82 Ibid., 50. “As soon as the Emperours thought themselves concern'd to look to its Government, and 
Protection, and were willing to abet the Spiritual Power of the Clergy with their Secular Authority; then 
began the Divine Providence to withdraw the miraculous Power of the Church (in the same manner as he 
did by degrees all the other extraordinary Gifts of the Apostolical Age, as their necessity ceased) as being 
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Richard Baxter, and John Owen.85 All three aimed at rebutting Parker’s charge of irrationality.86 
In doing so, they applied the Protestant ‘communicative’ iteration of the distinction against 
Parker’s more traditional ‘preservative’ interpretation. The withdrawal of God’s extraordinary 
Providence did not annex the care of Christianity to the magistrate, according to the non-
conformists, but rather altered the means by which the faithful were to verify propositions about 
God’s will. Ferguson in particular asserted that from that point on it was man’s rationality that 
allowed him to conform to the divine will.87 God ceased to communicate by miracles, and 
instead stamped his law into scripture and nature, so that human beings might save themselves 
through the exercise of their rationality alone. In the dissenting view, Parker and his ilk were the 
enthusiasts, impugning God’s gift of rationality and instead insisting on unthinking obedience.
                                                
85 Robert Ferguson, A sober enquiry into the nature, measure and principle of moral virtue, its distinction 
from gospel-holiness with reflections upon what occurs disserviceable to truth and religion in this matter: 
in three late books, viz. Ecclesiastical policy, Defence and continuation, and Reproof to The rehearsal 
transpos'd by R.F (London: Printed for D. Newman, 1673); John Owen, The reason of faith, or, An 
answer unto that enquiry, wherefore we believe the scripture to be the word of God with the causes and 
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be the word of God with faith divine and supernatural, are declared and vindicated (London : Printed for 
Nathaniel Ponder , 1677) Richard Baxter, The judgment of non-conformists of the interest of reason in 
matters of religion in which it is proved against make-bates, that both conformists, and non-conformists, 
and all parties of true Protestants are herein really agreed, though unskilful speakers differ in words 
(London, 1676). 
 
86 Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, 53. 
 
87  Hence Ferguson: “God creating Man a rational Creature, endowed him with Faculties and Powers 
capable of knowing what was congruous to the Nature of God and his dependence on him, and what was 
not.” Ferguson, 57. 
 
Miracles, Reason and Politics: Locke’s Skeptical Prudence Revisited 
Seventeenth century Protestant theology and natural philosophy thus offered Locke a 
robust theory in which he could ground his theory of toleration. We need not stop at 
circumstantial evidence, however, as there is abundant confirmation of Locke’s own 
subscription to the communicative theory of providence in his moral epistemology. 
Locke’s theory of knowledge is deeply complicated and a full explication would carry us 
beyond the scope of the current discussion. For our purposes, a brief outline of relevant 
points will suffice. Locke, unlike Boyle, did not think that human beings were fitted for 
knowledge of the natural world. In fact, as Richard Aschraft points out, Locke repeatedly 
and pointedly expressed opinions about “the meagerness of human knowledge” as to the 
true nature of reality.88 Rather, like Ferguson, in Locke’s view human cognitive faculties 
were equipped principally for knowledge of ‘morality and divinity.’89 We can, through 
the application of reason alone come to certain knowledge of God’s existence. Indeed, in 
Locke’s view, simply being in the world provides such copious evidence for Divine 
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89 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, collated and annotated with 
prolegomena, biographical, critical and historical by Alexander Campbell Fraser (New York: 
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creation that “there never was any rational creature that set himself to examine [the 
proposition that God exists] that could fail to assent to [it].”90  
Additionally, all the fundamental principles of morality attested to in scripture can 
be attained with certainty by rational reflection as well. “Morality is capable of 
demonstration, as well as mathematicks: since the precise real essence of the things moral 
words stand for may be perfectly known; and so the congruity and incongruity of the 
things themselves be certainly discovered; in which consists perfect knowledge.”91 For 
Locke, morality is deductive.92 When we compare the definition of our understanding of 
murder, for instance, with our definition of ‘wrongness,’ we can just ‘see’ that the latter 
can be predicated of the former. Like ‘Socrates is mortal,’ the statement ‘murder is 
wrong’ is true by definition. 
There are finer points of God’s will, however, such as that we ought not to work 
on the Sabbath or that the dead will be resurrected come judgment day, that are not 
available to reason. Rather, these things exist above reason. But we do not take the truth 
of these metaphysical opacities on faith alone. Rather, we believe them because their 
revelation was invariably accompanied by the miraculous.93 In Locke’s terminology, the 
                                                
90 ECHU, I/iii/17. 
 
91 ECHU, III/xi/16. 
 
92 Locke long promised, but never actually provided, a comprehensive deductive system of 
morality.   
 
93 Locke occasionally expresses contempt for prophecies in the old Testament that do not 
conform to his vision of revelation attended by extraordinary providence. For instance: “That 
things brought about in the ordinary course of providence and humane meanes are yet thus 
ascribed to the Spirit of god is very evident in the old Testament or else we must suppose that the 
spirit of god descend to meane offices of teaching the arts of weaving & embroidery.” Locke, “Of 
Immediate Inspiration” in Writings on Religion, ed. Victor Nuovo (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 38.  
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Sabbath and the Resurrection of the Dead are ‘credentialed’ by God’s extraordinary 
providence. “He who comes with a Message from God to be deliver’d to the world, 
cannot be refus’d belief if he vouches his Mission by a Miracle, because his credentials 
have a right to it. For every rational thinking Man must conclude as Nicodemus did, We 
know that thou art a teacher come from God, for no Man can do these signs which thou 
dost, except God be with him.”94 Nor do we take the fact that these breaks in the ordinary 
course of nature were indeed miracles for granted. We can be fairly sure that Christ and 
Moses were in fact messengers from God for purely legalistic reasons. Both performed 
miracles on numerous occasions, in the presence of multiple witnesses.95 
This is what is sometimes referred to as the ‘two track’ system of Locke’s moral 
epistemology, wherein reason and revelation act in a complementary fashion to cover the 
fundamental requirements of morality.96 “Reason is natural revelation, whereby the 
eternal father of light, and fountain of all knowledge, communicates to mankind that 
portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties: revelation is 
natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately, 
which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives, that they come 
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95 Interestingly, Joseph Glanvill made a similar argument for belief in witches. According to 
Glanvill, the wealth of records attesting to the existence of witches rendered arguments for their 
physical, logical, and theological impossibility specious. “We have the Attestation of thousands 
of Eye and Ear-witnesses, and those not of the easily deceivable Vulgar only, but of wise and 
grave Discerners; and that, when no Interest could oblige them to agree together in a common 
Lye: I say, we have the light of all these Circumstances to confirm us in the belief of things done 
by Persons of despicable Power and Knowledge, beyond the reach of Art, and ordinary Nature.” 
Glanvill, Essays on Several Important Subjects in Philosophy and Religion, (London, 1676): 
Essay VI, 2.  
 
96 See G.A.J. Rogers, “John Locke: Conservative Radical” in The Margins Of Orthodoxy: 
Heterodox Writing and Cultural Response, 1660-1750, ed. Robert D. Lund (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 97-116 
  
 39 
from God.”97 One should note, however, that encompassing both tracks is the fact that 
God always acts publicly. If there is some article that requires our belief or some act that 
needs to be done or avoided, then God will not fail to promulgate that fact in a manner 
that is accessible to all. The truths of divinity, morality, and revelation (when attended by 
miracles) can be rationally apprehended by any normal, reasoning adult.   
The publicity of God’s providence is the cornerstone of Locke’s conception of 
moral epistemology. Without publicity, propositions about God’s will are merely 
speculation. This was the problem Locke identified when he repeatedly inveighed against 
enthusiasm (a term he associated principally with Puritanism and Catholic claims to 
infallibility, but which he occasionally applied to Quakers as well) that claimed direct 
access to God’s will.98 In Locke’s view, such a claim cannot be considered valid because 
it is private. There are no means by which outside observer could verify or deny the claim 
to immediate inspiration. “If they know it to be a truth…[then] any other man may 
naturally know that it is so without the help of revelation.”99 Additionally, the enthusiasts 
themselves cannot be entirely sure that their ‘direct inspiration’ is genuinely from God 
and not a preternatural occurrence. “There may be spirits, which, without being divinely 
commissioned, may excite in those ideas in me, and lay them in such order, that I may 
                                                
97 ECHU IV/xix/4. 
 
98 Locke discussed Enthusiasm on two occasions, once in ECHU, and again in an unpublished 
document form 1687 entitled “On Immediate Inspiration.” For wider discussion of Enthusiasm, 
see Michael Heyd, Be Sober and Reasonable: The Critique of Enthusiasm in the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries (Leiden, New York and Koeln: E.J. Brill, 1995) as well as the collection 
Enthusiasm and Enlightenment in Europe, 1650-1850, eds. Lawrence J. Klein and Anthony J. La 
Vopa (San Marino: Huntington Library Press, 1998) There are remarkable parallels between 
Locke’s critiques of enthusiasm and his much more famous assault on innatism.  
 
99 ECHU IV/xix/11. 
 40 
perceive their connexion.”100 Ultimately Locke concludes that such claims must be 
assumed to be false, because in cases of genuine revelation, God would not permit such a 
degree of ambiguity. “If he would have us assent to the truth of any proposition, he either 
evidences that truth by the usual methods of natural reason, or else makes it known to be 
a truth which he would have us assent to, by his authority; and convinces us that it is 
from him, by some marks which reason cannot be mistaken in.”101 
The basic point is that, for Locke, the spheres of what is within our understanding 
and what lies beyond it are respectively coextensive with what God regards as essential 
and inessential. Therefore, determining the extent of human knowledge is the same as 
determining the extent of moral obligation. Further, it is clear that in demarcating what is 
essential and what is inessential in terms of the means by which God communicates his 
will to mankind, Locke is implicitly relying on the ordinary/extraordinary distinction. “I 
am far from denying that God can, or doth sometimes enlighten men’s minds in the 
apprehending of certain truths, or excite them to good actions by the immediate influence 
                                                
 
100 ECHU IV/xix/10. “I ask how shall any one distinguish between the delusions of Satan, and the 
inspirations of the Holy Ghost? He can transform himself into an angel of light. And they who are 
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message, till God, by another miracle of his rod turned into a serpent, had assured him of a power 
to testify his mission, by the same miracle repeated before them, whom he was sent to.” Ibid. 
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and assistance of the holy spirit, without any extraordinary signs accompanying it. But in 
such cases too we have reason and scripture, unerring rules to know whether it be from 
God or no.”102 
In light of all this, we can see that Locke’s ‘skeptical prudence’ in a new light. 
When Locke deploys the argument from ignorance, he is not simply saying that the 
magistrate should be reticent in legislating intolerance because he cannot be certain that 
what he is doing is right. Rather, he is arguing much more forcefully that the mere 
presence of ambiguity, the impenetrability of a proposition to reason, is sufficient to 
conclude that God does not consider the contents of the proposition essential.  Indeed, in 
doing so he is participating in a defense of religious non-conformity that stretched back at 
least fifteen years. 
Moreover, when Locke limits the sphere of magisterial control to ‘worldly 
welfare’ and the ‘ordinary course of life’ he is not prudentially separating the spheres of 
Church and State. On the contrary, he is recasting the role of the Godly Magistrate. 
Locke’s magistrate weighs only those dimensions of a practice that are amenable to 
rational examination when deciding whether or not it ought to be prohibited. The 
magistrate should consider what actions the performance of a practice will normally 
entail, and what effects will normally follow, and whether or not those are inherently 
objectionable. Conceived in this way, one can determine the essential moral status of a 
religious practice. This is because God will have arrayed the various moral properties of a 
religious practice in such a way that their morality is either self-evident, or demonstrable 
based upon rational proofs or empirical evidence. If we can, by employing our rational 
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faculties, ‘see’ that a religious practice is immoral, then the magistrate ought to prohibit 
it. If not, then God has left the matter opaque for a reason, namely that it does not trouble 
him overly much. 
Finally, we are also in a better position to see the actual issues at play between 
Locke and Proast. In essence, theirs was a disagreement between Protestants over how 
Christian Polities ought to conduct themselves in the absence of immediate instruction 
from God. That is, what it means for Christians to be left well and truly on their own. 
Proast’s High Anglican theory was that care of Christianity had fallen to corrupt human 
beings, and that without constant maintenance of the community of the faithful, the true 
religion would eventually wither and die. Locke’s theory of providence, by contrast, was 
essentially that of a dissenter (though Locke by the 1690s identified himself as a member 
of the Church of England).103 God, in Locke’s view, had never abandoned the triumph of 
the true religion solely to the care of human beings. Rather he had fitted their cognitive 
apparatus in such a way that in a free market of religious ideas, the true religion would 
eventually triumph as the most rational option available. When “men have done their 
duties…[God] bids us not to fear, until the end of the World.”104  
By advocating this providential reading of Locke’s arguments for toleration I do 
not wish to suggest that by 1690 Locke had developed an entirely consistent theological 
rationale for toleration. There are many ways in which Locke’s system falls short of 
coherence. The most obvious to the modern reader is the immense danger of putting all of 
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one’s theological eggs into one natural basket. The measurement of God’s will in terms 
of empirically available costs and benefits rather than Scriptural prescriptions and 
miraculous interventions lends itself quite easily to a world picture in which God is no 
longer necessary. If everything human beings need to be good, happy, and wise is 
available without God’s presence, then why should we, as Lavoisier famously (though 
perhaps apocryphally) pointed out a century later, retain such a bizarre and irrational 
hypothesis? Thus it is difficult not to cringe a little (or smirk perhaps, depending upon 
one’s metaphysical predilections) as Locke confidently declaims on the immediate and 
incontrovertible availability of God’s existence to human reason. After all, it was not 
‘religion’ per se whose philosophical supports collapsed in the post-Darwin era but 
rather, as Margaret Jacob has pointed out, the very specific natural theology formulated 
by Locke and his contemporaries.105 
There is good reason to think that Locke very quickly began to appreciate this 
danger, as by the mid 1690s he had already begun to pull away from the notion that 
everything human beings needed was available through reason working with the senses. 
In 1695, Locke came into possession of some early draft papers of John Toland’s 
Christianity Not Mysterious, in which Toland the Deist seemingly took certain articles of 
Locke’s reasoning to their logical conclusion by arguing that there was nothing 
worthwhile in Christian revelation that could not be readily apprehended by reason acting 
alone.106 Locke’s response was The Reasonableness of Christianity, in which his central 
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thesis was that in spite of reason’s immense power, there were still some things necessary 
to salvation that could only be achieved through acceptance of revealed truth.107  
Further, lest we be lured into thinking Locke’s theology more modern than it 
actually is, it is important to note that Locke did think, even in 1685, that it was perfectly 
acceptable for the magistrate to engage in the moral coercion of his subjects.108 This was 
a tendency in his thinking that only became more pronounced over the course of the 
1690s. By the third letter, he openly advocates laws against drunkenness, lasciviousness 
and debauchery.109 Indeed, during this time, Locke became associated with John 
Tillotson’s campaign for moral regeneration as well as the Societies For the Reformation 
of Manners.110 
 Nonetheless, this providential reading suggests that accounts of Locke’s political 
thinking that emphasize skepticism and prudence require some substantial revision. 
Though the frailty of human knowledge and prudential governance are parts of Locke’s 
theory of toleration, they do not lie at its center. On the contrary, the key component for 
Locke’s conception of toleration and its limits is a God not altogether unlike the one who 
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saved Descartes from his evil demon fifty years earlier. Locke’s God assures us that if we 
apply ourselves diligently to the works of his creation, we can as individuals using our 
own rational judgment discover all that is necessary for virtue and salvation. The result is 
a divinely ordained separation of the religious and political spheres, wherein the 
magistrate is only responsible for those aspects of human life where moral agreement is 
possible. The limited nature of human knowledge is in fact an unrecognized blessing, as 
it illuminates the limits of human political and moral obligation. Skepticism of this sort, 
in Locke’s view, generated true religion, true morality, and Godly politics.
Conclusion: A Crisis of the European Mind? 
 
Thanks to Jonathan Israel’s imposing two-volume interpretation of the European 
Enlightenment, it has become fashionable once again to speak forcefully of a ‘crisis of 
the European mind.’111 According to Israel, by 1650, the passions that inflamed the wars 
of religion had petered out, and European authorities had settled into a new age of 
orthodoxy. Simultaneously, as a result of the scientific revolution and the emergence of 
the new philosophy, Europe underwent an intellectual crisis in the years after 1650. The 
contest between confessions was replaced by a new intellectual dialectic between reason 
and faith. Out of this dialectic emerged not one enlightenment, but two. One–the 
“moderate, mainstream enlightenment”–sought to reconcile Christian belief and the 
socio-political status quo with the new modes of thinking.112 A more radical 
enlightenment, inspired by Spinoza and Bayle, by contrast: 
 
rejected all compromise with the past and sought to sweep away existing 
structures entirely, rejecting the creation as traditionally understood in Judeo 
Christian civilization, and the intervention of a providential God in human affairs, 
denying the possibility of miracles, scorning all forms of ecclesiastical authority, 
and refusing to accept that there is any God-ordained social hierarchy, 
concentration of privilege or land ownership in noble hands, or religious sanction 
for monarchy.113
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This radical enlightenment, much more than the moderate is, in Israel’s view, responsible 
for developing the “philosophical package” of modern progressive values.114  
Locke’s usage of the distinction between God’s Ordinary and Extraordinary 
Providence does not, on the face of it, imperil this formulation to any great extent. By 
Israel’s measure, Locke was firmly placed in the ‘moderate mainstream enlightenment’ 
that sought to reconcile the new philosophy and Christian belief.115 That such a thinker 
would employ religious language is therefore unsurprising. Locke, however, was not an 
isolated case. There were others, both outside of England and of a purportedly more 
radical outlook, who saw the distinction as useful. The most obvious case is the 
Neapolitan Giambattista Vico, whose Scienza Nuova was organized around a nebulous 
providentialism inherent in nature and history.116 But there are other examples as well. 
Pierre Bayle used the distinction as part of his assault on portentous interpretations of the 
comet that appeared in 1680.117 It was Leibniz’s invocation of the distinction that first 
pushed Samuel Clarke to insinuate that he was an Epicurean.118 Even the supposed arch-
infidels Hobbes and Spinoza employed the distinction. It shaped the discussion of 
miracles in Leviathan, and in the Opera Spinoza insisted that we must understand God’s 
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power as being broken into ordained, absolute, ordinary and extraordinary 
components.119  
I do not wish to suggest that the Enlightenment was a religious phenomenon 
through and through. Though they may have exhibited some religious trappings, the 
ideologies that emerged in the second half of the eighteenth century and helped to 
bloodily sweep away France’s old regime represented themselves as being profoundly 
anti-Christian. I do not see any need to do other than take them at their word. I do wish to 
suggest, however, that we ought not to automatically assume threads of continuity from 
the enlightenment’s beginnings to its end. On the contrary, if I am correct and there is in 
fact a widespread usage of meaning-laden theological language in the second half of the 
seventeenth century, then there is a case to be made for a substantial blurring of the 
boundaries between Europe’s confessional period and the early enlightenment.   
 Moreover, I think this also poses difficulties for Israel’s partitioning of the early 
enlightenment into radical and moderate branches based upon their relative embrace or 
rejection of a “philosophical package” of modernity. Again, if I am correct, then the early 
enlightenment was animated less by an anachronistic battle between orthodox 
conservatives and atheistic democrats than by the shared project of trying to develop a 
theology appropriate to a world transformed by the religious and political struggles of the 
preceding two centuries. Some of these solutions can, I am certain, be described as more 
‘radical’ than others. The question is radical in which respect–radically irreligious or 
religiously radical? In my view, it may be the case that at the end of the seventeenth 
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century, many commentators across the political and philosophical spectrum began to 
believe that a God who was to some degree immanent could resolve more philosophical, 
political and moral quandaries than one wholly transcendent. In a Europe shaped for over 
a millennium by Judeo-Christian traditions and the insistence on God’s separateness from 
his creation, that widespread shift in preference in itself would be radical enough. In other 
words, I think Israel is correct to suggest that the period after 1650 saw watershed 
changes in the structure of European intellectual life. I think he is wrong, however, to 
suggest that what made these changes significant, both historically and philosophically, 
was their supposed break with Europe’s Christian past. My sense is that the closer we 
look at the crucial period of 1650 to 1750, the more we are going to find that the 
“philosophical package” of modernity, including liberal notions of tolerance, has its roots 
in the surreptitious insertion of the Christian God into nature.
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